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Thucydides in Pyongyang: 
Fear, Honor and Interests 
in the 1968 Pueblo Incident 
Benjamin R. Young
Structured Abstract
Article Type: Research Paper
Purpose—On January 23, 1968, North Korean naval forces captured a U.S. spy
ship, the USS Pueblo, off the coast of Wonsan. This incident nearly led to a second
Korean War and heightened hostilities between the U.S. and North Korean govern-
ments. This article demystifies the strategic thinking of Kim Il Sung’s regime and
clarifies the reasoning behind Pyongyang’s risky undertaking in capturing the Pueblo
and its crewmen as a rational and pragmatic action.
Design, Methodology, Approach—While the Pueblo crisis has been examined by
a number of historians, this article, which is based on former Eastern bloc archival
documents and North Korean periodicals, uses a  multi- causal theoretical framework
from an ancient Greek historian, Thucydides, in order to analyze the importance of
fear, honor, and interest within North Korea’s military culture.
Findings—This article argues that North Korean regime’s fear of South Korea’s
imminent economic supremacy and rising Japanese militarism along with defending
the honor of Kim Il Sung and the DPRK’s territorial boundaries and advancing the
interests of the global revolutionary movement factored greatly into Pyongyang’s
 decision- making process in 1968.
Practical Implications—In analyzing North Korea’s seemingly irrational aggres-
sion, it is vital to take a  multi- causal approach, such as the one provided by Thucy-
dides, into understanding North Korea’s past and present actions.
Originality, Value—Rather than arguing the 1968 Pueblo crisis as one motivated
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by internal or external concerns, this article posits that the North Korean leadership
took a number of concerns into account and acted rationally in their capture of the
Pueblo spy ship.
Keywords: culture, Kim Il Sung, military, North Korea, Pueblo incident
I. Introduction
In his timeless account of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides pinpoints fear,
honor, and interest as the causes of military conflict. Although Thucydides’ History
of the Peloponnesian War is most often credited as being the birthplace of realist
theory in international relations, the ancient Athenian historian also prioritized the
more malleable concept of emotion as the driver of war. As Thucydides himself
explained, “The subsequent development of our power was originally forced upon
us by circumstances; fear was our first motive; afterwards honor, and then interest
stepped in.”1 Prominent members of the U.S. government have recently evoked the
insights of Thucydides. In 2012, U.S. General Martin Dempsey, former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, “Thucydides in the 5th century B.C. said that all
strategy is some combination of reaction to fear, honor and interests; and I think
all nations act in response to one of those three things.”2 In 2013, U.S. National Secu-
rity H.R McMaster wrote in a New York Times  op- ed, “People fight today for the
same reasons Thucydides identified 2,500 years ago: fear, honor and interest.”3 Mean-
while, U.S. General James Mattis mentioned the Thucydidean trinitarian analysis
in his own confirmation hearing as U.S. Secretary of Defense.4 Due to the universal
applicability of Thucydides’ timeless approach and the near eruption of a second
Korean War in the late 1960s, I use fear, honor, and interest as a lens into the causes
of the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis in which a U.S. intelligence vessel was captured by
North Korean armed forces in international waters.
Historians have debated the reasons why North Korean leader Kim Il Sung took
a massive risk on January 23, 1968, by capturing the USS Pueblo in international
waters and detaining the 83 crewmen for 11 months. Many scholars have linked the
escalation of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam with the North Korean leader’s military
adventurism in the late 1960s.5 Since the U.S. was bogged down militarily in Southeast
Asia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the official title of North Korea,
hereafter DPRK) could afford to be more risky in its inter–Korean context and also
assist their North Vietnamese allies by distracting the U.S. on two fronts in Asia.
Nonetheless, more recent scholarship has disputed the coordination of events in
Vietnam with the heightening of tensions on the Korean peninsula in the late 1960s.
For example, historian Mitchell Lerner emphasizes the domestic environment of
North Korea in the late 1960s and the need for Kim Il Sung’s regime to divert public
attention from economic issues by suddenly capturing the U.S. naval ship and cre-
ating war hysteria internally.6 Historian Balázs Szalontai argues that Kim Il Sung
pursued his own  self- interested militant strategy during the late 1960s and that the
Vietnam War did not influence the North Korean capture of the Pueblo.7 This article
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takes a different approach into examining the causes behind the North Korea’s cap-
ture of the Pueblo and argues that the regime’s fear of South Korea’s imminent eco-
nomic supremacy and rising Japanese militarism along with defending the honor of
Kim Il Sung and North Korea’s territorial boundaries and advancing the interests
of the global revolutionary movement factored greatly into Kim Il Sung’s  decision-
making process in 1968.
II. Thucydides’ Trinity
Spurred on by Harvard University Professor Graham’s Allison idea of the
“Thucydides trap,” many political scientists have recently evoked the work of Thucy-
dides in regard to great power transition and the fear of a rising China.8 However,
Thucydides’ linkage of honor and interests as also being drivers of warfare has been
largely ignored within the field of international relations. Allison’s overemphasis on
fear has distracted scholars from engaging with Thucydides’  three- tiered articulation
of honor and interests as also being war igniters. As Professor Albert B. Wolf
explains, “Despite the length of Allison’s book, its overwhelming emphasis is placed
on just one of these three drivers: fear. Insufficient space and attention is paid to
great powers’ search for honor or status.”9
Allison’s engagement with Thucydides has oversimplified the nuanced and
complex nature of The Peloponnesian War. In fact, as Lowell Gustafson describes,
Allison honed in on only one sentence in Thucydides’ massive 600-page book, The
Peloponnesian War, to describe his argument: “It was the rise of Athens and the fear
that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” As Gustafson explains, “Impor-
tant people could portray themselves as intellectually profound by discussing the work
of a renowned Harvard professor and a famous author of antiquity, and only had to
remember one sentence about war erupting between ruling, fearful Sparta and rising
Athens. Seldom has the ability to project erudition come so easily.”10 In other words,
evoking Thucydides has become a superficial way to demonstrate one’s sophistica-
tion and intellectualism. Compressing Thucydides’ complex theories of human nature
into one sentence is not just oversimplified but dangerous in justifying a confronta-
tional U.S. approach to contemporary China. By engaging with all three of Thucydides’
drivers of war, I hope to bring the ancient Greek historian’s  multi- causal theoretical
framework into the forefront of international relations and military history.
One of the criticisms of the “Thucydides trap” theory revolves around the idea
that Allison’s argument was never applied to a non–Western context. As David Kang
and Xinru Ma correctly argue in their article “Thucydides Didn’t Live in East Asia,”
Allison’s use of twelve European case studies “has led to an  over- expectation that
power transitions and the rise and decline of great powers relative to each other are
a prime factor for war.” Kang and Ma are right to call out Allison’s Eurocentrism.
This idea that Thucydides only talked about  fear- based power transitions as a driver
of war fundamentally neglects the wider scope of the ancient Greek historian’s work,
especially his argument that honor and interests play an equally important role in
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starting wars. By condensing all of Thucydides’ complexity into one simple sentence,
Allison has not only misrepresented the ancient Greek historian’s complex theories
of the human condition but also invoked a number of other scholars’ responses to
his book that reiterate his distortion of Thucydides. Nevertheless, as Kang and Ma
correctly assert, case studies should go beyond Europe in explaining Thucydides’
theories of war origins. In this article, I hope to do that with the 1968 Pueblo incident
and the broader military culture of the DPRK.
Maritime issues and territorial disputes still factor into the DPRK’s foreign pol-
icy. As evidenced by the DPRK’s bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, ter-
ritorial integrity greatly influences Pyongyang’s maritime strategy in Northeast Asia.
North Korea’s  state- run media stated that this bombardment was retaliation for
South Korea’s shelling in the DPRK’s waters. The North Korean news agency said
the DPRK will “continue to make merciless military attacks with no hesitation if the
South Korean enemy dares to invade our sea territory by 0.001mm.”11 From capturing
Chinese fishermen who entered North Korean waters to claiming Dokdo as DPRK
territory, Pyongyang views maritime security as regime security.12 The origins of
this  maritime- regime security conflation began during the Cold War era, with crises
such as the Pueblo incident.
The U.S. State Department in 1968 explained, “North Korea is the most denied
of denied areas and the most difficult of all intelligence targets. Estimates of North
Korean strength, intentions, and capabilities, therefore, cannot be made with a high
degree of confidence.”13 For the purposes of investigating the history of North Korean
foreign relations, Thucydides’ theory of fear, honor, and interests as drivers of war
dissipates some of the opaqueness of Kim Il Sung’s foreign policy in the late 1960s.
As internal North Korean archival documents are inaccessible, researchers often to
look into the archives of Pyongyang’s former communist allies, such as Hungary,
as ways to gain insight into the regime’s mindset. This article uses materials from
the North Korean  state- run media and newly available Russian, Czechoslovakian,
and Romanian archival documents housed digitally at the Wilson Center’s North
Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP). Although these Eastern Bloc
documents provide valuable assistance to the modern historian in accessing
Pyongyang’s diplomatic relations, the actual  decision- making processes of the  often-
mysterious North Korean leadership remain little understood without an analytical
framework. Thus, the universalism of Thucydides’ trinitarian analysis can help
demystify Kim Il Sung’s reasoning for his armed forces’ reckless capture of the Pueblo
on January 23, 1968. Using Eastern bloc documents and North Korean periodicals,
this article uses fear, honor, and interests as a window into the causes of the Pueblo
crisis from the DPRK leadership’s perspective.
III. Fear
From the mid–1950s to the mid–1960s, the DPRK government prided itself 
on being the more economically superior country on the Korean peninsula. The
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Chollima Movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s propelled North Korean indus-
trialization and economic development.14 However, in the late 1960s, it became more
apparent that North Korea’s Stalinist economy was beginning to falter while South
Korea’s capitalist economy was on the rise. A February 9, 1968, Czechoslovakian
diplomatic report said, “Today, when it is already clear that the DPRK cannot expect
to surpass South Korea economically in the near future—and everything shows the
DPRK abandoned these goals for good—the possibility of peaceful unification of
the country is disappearing….”15 Czechoslovakian diplomats noted in 1968 that the
North Korean leadership followed “with growing anxiety” South Korea’s economic
development, which was brought back “from the brink of total collapse” under Pres-
ident Park Chung Hee’s policies and stabilized with West German, Japanese, and
U.S. investment.16 This reversal of economic statuses between the two Koreas caused
fear north of the DMZ as the Kim Il Sung’s regime had to look for a new source of
legitimacy in order to retain prestige.
In addition to South Korea’s growing economic power, the North Korean lead-
ership also feared rising Japanese militarism. The North Korean ambassador to the
Soviet Union told his counterpart in May 1968, “The Japanese authorities are increas-
ing their penetration of South Korea, they are entering into an ever closer conspiracy
with the South Korean puppets: the Japanese militarists are preparing plans for war
against the DPRK.”17 This fear of a Japanese invasion loomed large in the North
Korean consciousness as imperialist Japan had colonized the Korean peninsula from
1910 to 1945. Due to this recent historical memory, North Korean leadership believed
its socialist allies “underestimated the danger of a revival of Japanese militarism.”18
The fear of a rising South Korean economy and a militaristic Japan pushed the North
Korean leadership into a more militant direction itself. In 1968, Kim Il Sung forth-
rightly stated, “We don’t want war, but also we are not afraid of it. The people and
the army of the DPRK will answer each single action of the enemy with a counter-
action and will answer total war with total war.”19
As its Eastern bloc allies understood well, the DPRK’s unique political culture
developed out of its distinctly  anti- colonial heritage. In the 1930s, a majority of the
North Korean leadership with Kim Il Sung as its commander fought a protracted
guerrilla war against Japanese colonialists in the mountains of Manchuria. This guer-
rilla fighting experience of its leadership later gave the North Korean state a militant
and  anti- colonial character.20 In 1968, the East German ambassador to the DPRK
said, “Before and during World War II, Korea had been a brutally exploited Japanese
colony in which the brutality of the occupiers exceeded that of the German fascists.”
He continued, “The Korean Workers’ Party [KWP, ruling body of the North Korean
government] never had any experience of bourgeois democracy, of struggle for the
economic rights of the workers, and, in our opinion, is therefore not ready at the
present time to either understand or influence the economic struggle of the South
Korean workers.” He concluded, “The only path in which it is richly experienced is
the military one, the path of arms.”21 As its leaders were guerrilla fighters at their
core, the North Korean regime began to tie its legitimacy to the military in the late
1960s. Amid South Korea’s growing economic superiority and fear of its own inad-
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equacy vis-à-vis Seoul, Pyongyang pursued a militant direction that it was familiar
with and in which it had vast experience. Thus, the Kim regime’s rash capture of
the Pueblo and its other insurgent actions in the late 1960s, such as the January 21,
1968, Blue House raid in Seoul by DPRK commandos and the downing of a U.S. EC-
121 aircraft in 1969 by North Korean pilots in open air space, begin to make sense
within this framework of fear and  military- oriented legitimacy.
In the late 1960s, the North Korean government pushed new rhetoric that called
for the violent reunification of the Korean peninsula. Czechoslovakian diplomats in
Pyongyang noticed in 1968 that the slogan “peaceful and democratic unification of
the country” disappeared from domestic propaganda and that “the main source and
cause of persistent tension on the Korean Peninsula is the fact that Korea remains
a divided country, and that strong South Korean and American armies, with modern
arms, stand in the South.”22 Perhaps envious of North Vietnam’s drive to reunify
their own country, Kim Il Sung began pushing a new domestic propaganda campaign
in January 1967 that urged the population to reunify the peninsula within the lifetime
of the present generation.
The Romanian embassy in the DPRK also became increasingly nervous in 1968
that North Korean aggression would lead to war on the peninsula. A day after the
capture of the Pueblo, a Romanian diplomatic report said, “We believe that the
provocations which have emerged recently are attributable to the North Koreans
entirely and in this way they put into practice the motto: ‘let us be ready and take
initiative to welcome the forthcoming great revolutionary event of the reunification
of the motherland.’”23 North Korea’s capture of the Pueblo perplexed foreign
observers that questioned why such a small nation dared to once again draw the
powerful giant across the Pacific into a military conflict it was bound to lose. How-
ever, North Korea’s loss of economic legitimacy vis-à-vis South Korea provoked fear
among its leadership that the regime may soon lose  inter- Korean legitimacy as a
whole. This fear activated North Korea’s insurgent character and made the regime
pursue a more aggressive strategy, such as the Pueblo incident, in order to boost its
new  military- oriented legitimacy.
Despite being an absolute autocracy, Kim Il Sung’s North Korea still depended
on a degree of popular support. Amid economic liberalization measures in other
parts of the Eastern Bloc, the regime in Pyongyang most likely felt its own inter–
Korean legitimacy slip away vis-à-vis Seoul’s growing international profile during
the late 1960s. As a divided nation, the DPRK’s political culture depended on penin-
sular legitimacy. Thus, the capture of the Pueblo can be tied back to Pyongyang’s
own economic insecurities vis-à-vis South Korea in the late 1960s and its subsequent
pursuit of militancy that was derived from its leadership’s guerrilla experiences dur-
ing the Japanese colonial period.
Thucydides referenced the ancient Syracusian general Hermocrates as saying,
“Nobody is driven into war by ignorance, and no one who thinks he will gain any-
thing from it is deterred by fear … when there is mutual fear, men think twice before
they make aggressions upon one another.”24 In 1968, North Korea toed the fine line
between military skirmish and  all- out war. Echoing Hermocrates’ quote above, the
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leadership in Pyongyang understood an  all- out war would destroy their regime but
also assumed that the U.S. did not want a  two- front war in Asia with conflicts in
both Vietnam and Korea. Thus, the DPRK’s detention of the Pueblo crewmen was
opportunistic given the U.S. military’s limitations in 1968 and the growing  anti- war
sentiments within the U.S. population at the time. On this occasion, mutual fear
may have saved the  Asia- Pacific region from another devastating war.
IV. Honor
In 1968, North Korea political culture took on an increasingly sycophantic
nature. Czechoslovakian diplomats explained, “Especially in the last year, the per-
sonality cult of Kim Il Sung reached unprecedented magnitude. Attributes attached
to his name often run several lines. Kim Il Sung is credited with all successes and
victories past and present without regard to historical facts.”25 By 1968, Kim Il Sung
had cemented his place as absolute authority of the DPRK and created one of the
most pervasive personality cults in the communist world. Due to the declining eco-
nomic conditions of the DPRK in the late 1960s, the cultish leader worship of Kim
Il Sung rested upon his supposed greatness as an anti–Japanese guerrilla fighter in
the 1930s and military leader who once brought the U.S. military to a standstill in
the Korean War. In other words, his honor as the “Great Leader” rested on his mil-
itary prowess. As Thucydides explained, “Yet to me personally, war brings honor
… for I believe that the sense of a man’s own interest will quicken his interest in the
prosperity of the state.”26
According to the founding DPRK Constitution of 1948, the capital of the DPRK
was officially Seoul.27 The shift from Seoul to Pyongyang as the DPRK’s official
capital city was only changed in the amended 1972 constitution.28 Thus, the military
adventurism of the DPRK in January 1968 makes sense within this propagandistic
context of Kim Il Sung as the symbol of a unified Korea. Since the DPRK government
officially claimed the entire Korean peninsula as its territory and Kim Il Sung as
“the leader of forty million Korean people,” the honor of defending the DPRK’s sov-
ereignty intertwined with the cultish leader worship of the “Great Leader.” As Fyodor
Tertitskiy explains, Kim Il Sung’s personality cult grew extensively in April and May
1967, which changed the DPRK “from a  Soviet- style relatively moderate dictatorship
into the rather grotesque autocracy North Korea is now known to be.”29 This growth
in power of Kim Il Sung’s personality cult after 1967 seemed to have an immediate
effect on the DPRK’s foreign policy, thereby making Pyongyang more militaristic
and aggressive in its pursuit of advancing its notion of national sovereignty.
Despite the social control and autocratic nature of North Korea in 1968, Kim
Il Sung still needed to reinforce his domestic authority by occasionally demonstrating
his military skills and ability to defend the DPRK’s territorial integrity. As later evi-
denced by the assassination of Romanian autocrat and Kim Il Sung’s personal friend
Nicolae Ceausescu, the demands of an isolated population should not be completely
ignored and authoritarian regimes need to have a source of legitimacy from which
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to draw from during times of internal economic distress. In other words, the daily
sacrifices of the citizenry need to be validated. For Kim Il Sung’s government, as its
economic development stalled in the late 1960s, this legitimacy source began to be
the military and the regime’s ability to defend the North Korean people from foreign
forces.
Thus, the Pueblo incident of January 1968 was tied to Kim Il Sung’s newfound
legitimacy source of military honor. As Eastern bloc allies noted in the late 1960s,
the North Korean leadership officially followed a parallel development line in both
the economic and military sectors but the  build- up of national defense gradually
started to overshadow the economic concerns. The East German ambassador to the
DPRK explained in mid–February 1968, “Retreat from the path of [becoming] an
economic model and [of pursuing] peaceful unification had also been foreshadowed
by giving new content to the old policy of parallel development of the DPRK’s econ-
omy and defense.” The ambassador added, “The whole economy is being effectively
subordinated to armament requirements—an area in which the DPRK has a lead
over South Korea, which only plans to build its first armament plants this year.”30
Kim Il Sung could not fulfill all the material necessities of his countrymen but would
protect the nation from foreign invasion. This was the message broadcasted to the
North Korean population from Pyongyang in 1968.
The events of January 1968 triggered an atmosphere of paranoia in North Korea
and made many in the DPRK believe a war would breakout on the peninsula at any
moment. As a February 27, 1968, editorial in the Rodong Sinmun, the primary news-
paper of the KWP, proclaimed, “Let’s fight against the U.S. imperialists’ frenzied
 war- fighting measures and further strengthen the nation’s defense power.” The edi-
torial explained, “Now in our country, the systematic aggression of U.S. imperialism
and their provocations are becoming more and more serious, and the situation is
very tense.”31 North Korean propaganda depicted the Pueblo incident as a clear sign
of U.S. aggression and intention to invade the DPRK. Czechoslovakian diplomats
explained that North Korean propaganda “makes every effort to convince the DPRK
citizens and the world that the situation is quite analogous to that just before the
beginning of the Korean War.” Slogans, such as those urging citizens to build the
DPRK into an “invincible fortress of steel,” circulated in North Korean propaganda
and the unavoidability of war was theoretically vindicated, as trepidation of military
conflict with the imperialists was a signal of bourgeois pacifism and socialist revi-
sionism.32
One of the major factors in North Korea’s unwillingness to release the Pueblo
crewmen was the leadership’s belief that Kim Il Sung’s honor, and by extension the
honor of the nation itself, was affronted when the Pueblo supposedly crossed into
the DPRK’s territorial waters on January 23, 1968. Based on a request from the North
Korean government, representatives from the Soviet Union told U.S. officials in
Pueblo negotiations that the crisis could partially be settled if the “national dignity
of the DPRK is not insulted by making it responsible for the incident.”33As an
absolute autocracy with a pervasive personality cult, the Kim family regime was
extremely concerned with the notion of honor and pride. To suggest the DPRK was
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a maverick aggressor was to slander the “Great Leader” Kim Il Sung himself. As
Czechoslovakian diplomats pointed out in early February 1968, “[North] Korean
propaganda places an equal sign between Kim Il Sung and Korea, while Korea is
presented as an example for other countries.”34 Thus, the North Korean government
took national honor and pride very seriously in its foreign relations as it was directly
tied to the personality cult of Kim Il Sung.
The Soviets strongly urged the DPRK government in February 1968 to release
the Pueblo crewmen and explained to the North Koreans “that by adopting tough
measures for defense of its sovereignty, the DPRK has [already] politically won.” By
releasing the prisoners, the Soviets “told [the] Korean comrades that such a step
from their side could not be interpreted as weakness; on the contrary, it would be
appreciated everywhere as a show of a responsible approach, and it would strengthen
even more the international position of the DPRK.”35 The North Koreans did not
follow this advice from their Soviet allies and instead held onto the crewmen for ten
more months and subjected them to numerous torture sessions and propaganda
 photo- ops. The North Koreans only released the crewmen after they had publicly
declared in front of  state- run media that they had violated the sovereignty of the
DPRK and the U.S. government admitted to crossing into their territorial waters.36
The U.S. government underestimated the importance of national dignity and pride
to the Kim family regime and may have prolonged the suffering of the crewmen by
not publicly apologizing to the DPRK government earlier. While this false admission
would have been an early propaganda coup for the North Koreans, the crewmen
endured months of torture and harsh conditions as a result of the U.S. government’s
inability to do so sooner.
During the domestic economic volatility in 1968, the regime’s ability to repel
foreign intervention and Western imperialist aggression bolstered the North Korean
masses’ support for Kim Il Sung’s leadership. North Korea’s capture of the Pueblo
crewmen signaled to the domestic audience that violations of the DPRK’s territorial
integrity would not be tolerated, which evoked a militant fervor among the DPRK’s
population. As the East German ambassador in Pyongyang explained in a March 4,
1968, letter, “The most significant element of the current domestic situation in the
DPRK is the creation, respectively fueling, of an  all- out war psychosis among the
population. Given their limited sources of information, average citizens must arrive
at the conclusion that war is imminent in the very immediate future.”37 While the
U.S. government confirmed that the Pueblo never entered the DPRK’s territorial
waters, Pyongyang insisted that the U.S. spy ship had illegally entered their waters
and thus violated their national sovereignty. As a declassified CIA document from
January 23, 1968, explained, “The closest point of approach [of the Pueblo] to the
North Korean cost was to be 13 nautical miles (the Koreans claim territorial waters
of 12 nautical miles).”38 In 1968, North Korea’s insistence on its territorial waters
may have seemed absurd to U.S. policymakers. The same CIA document noted,
“This incident points up North Korea’s constant concern over possible border vio-
lations—heightened in this case by direct U.S. involvement.” However, as a small
divided nation with a stagnant economy, the regime’s emphasis on national security
76            JOURNAL OF TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME STUDIES, WINTER/SPRING 2020
and borders was tied to Kim Il Sung’s personal honor as a supposed protector of the
North Korean people.
In negotiations with the U.S. Rear Admiral John V. Smith in Panmunjom on
January 24, 1968, North Korea’s Major General Pak Chung Kook referred to the
Pueblo’s violation of the DPRK’s territorial waters as a “piratical act.” Pak told Smith,
“I strongly demand that you frankly admit the violations, provocations, and aggres-
sive acts committed by your side in the demilitarized zone and in our coastal
waters.”39 The DPRK government’s demand for an official U.S. apology tied back to
Pyongyang’s constant assertion of its national sovereignty. As the official U.S. cryp-
tologic history of the Pueblo incident explains, the DPRK’s attack was a “deliberate
act” and “the North Koreans were prepared to face a period of sharply heightened
tensions” as a result of their aggression.40 Thus, the Pueblo incident seems to have
been a diplomatic crisis manufactured by Kim Il Sung to mobilize the North Korean
public into a revolutionary fervor and militant anti–American zeal. By supposedly
crossing into the DPRK’s territorial waters, Pyongyang depicted the Pueblo as a gen-
uine example of U.S. imperialism and war provocations.
North Korea’s daringness to prolong negotiations with the U.S. government
over the release of the Pueblo crewmen indicates that the regime saw themselves as
operating from a position of strength. In a March 13, 1968, meeting with Romanian
diplomats in Pyongyang, the President of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the
DPRK Baek  Nam- un said, “If the United States dared to attack us, we look forward
to it, because this will mark their defeat and their definitive expulsion from our
land.”41 This type of bravado was partially performance but also indicative of North
Korean overconfidence in their sociopolitical system.
While the DPRK military was undeniably weaker than that of the U.S. in 1968,
the North Koreans were equipped with the ideology of Kim Il Sung. The “Great
Leader” himself even admitted as such at the 20th Anniversary of the Korean People’s
Army (KPA) when he noted, “Political-moral superiority provides the opportunity
to defeat even an enemy which is better equipped technologically.”42 While Kim Il
Sung’s ideology provided no actual protection from gunfire, the political indoctri-
nation and pervasiveness of the personality cult was so complete by 1968 that North
Korean soldiers may have genuinely felt the morally inferior U.S. armed forces would
lose in a second Korean War, especially since it was bogged down in Vietnam and
losing its battle to the Vietnamese Communists.
The servicemen and servicewomen of the Korean People’s Army also became
tied to the cultish leader worship of Kim Il Sung. Defense Minister Kim Jangbong
said in his speech at the 20th Anniversary of the KPA, “Our Korean People’s Army
has solidly armored itself with the unitary ideology of our party. She is fiercely loyal
only to the great revolutionary ideology of Comrade Kim Il Sung, our respected and
beloved leader, and does not know of any other ideology.”43 A July 1968 article from
the North Korean magazine Chollima on the Pueblo crisis explains, “Even the brutal
U.S. imperialists would not dare to fight the heroic People’s Army again, whose
hearts are filled with devotion to their Great Leader. If the bastards forget this lesson
and rush into it again, it will be death and corpses.”44 The U.S. government’s inability
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to understand the North Korean concept of military honor and its linkage to Kim
Il Sung’s personality cult most likely impeded Washington’s ability to negotiate the
early release of the Pueblo crewmen.
V. Interests
Amid the  Sino- Soviet split of the late 1960s, the leadership in Pyongyang adroitly
navigated the complexities of this ideological conflict. One of the ways in which the
North Korean regime did so was by generating the idea of a new unified  anti-
imperialist front that consisted of small revolutionary countries.45 While Moscow
and Beijing quarreled over the role of the rightful torchbearer of international com-
munism, the North Korean leadership saw itself, Cuba, and North Vietnam as being
the  three- headed vanguard of world revolution and sought to create a formal inter-
national organization under the rubric of “Parties of small countries.” The Soviet
Foreign Affairs Ministry explained in 1968, “In the opinion of the Korean leaders
the DPRK, Cuba, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [official title of North
Vietnam, DRV], who stand ‘at the front lines of the revolutionary  anti- imperialist
struggle,’ should become the nucleus of such an organization.”46 Thus, North Korea’s
 self- interests in 1968 were linked to the struggles of the Cuban and Vietnamese rev-
olutions. As the Soviets explained, “Kim Il Sung is promoting a ‘strategy’ of fighting
imperialism with the forces of ‘small revolutionary’ countries which are to ‘tear
American imperialism apart’ everywhere.”47 North Korea’s capture of the Pueblo
was very much tied to the war in Vietnam as well as an attempt to distract the U.S.
from interfering in the Cuban revolution as it once did at the Bay of Pigs invasion
in 1961.48 Evoking Thucydides’ quote, “For true expediency is only this—to have an
enduring sense of gratitude towards good allies for their services, while we do not
neglect our own immediate interest,” the Pueblo incident benefited both Pyongyang
and its two revolutionary allies in the Third World.49
In the summer of 1965, Kim Il Sung met North Vietnamese Deputy Prime Min-
ister and Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi in Pyongyang. During their conversation,
the North Korean leader offered large amounts of DPRK assistance to the Vietnamese
and explained, “We are determined to provide aid to Vietnam and we do not view
such aid as constituting a heavy burden on North Korea. We will strive to ensure
that Vietnam will defeat the American imperialists, even if it means that North
Korea’s own economic plan will be delayed.”50 In that same summer, Kim told a vis-
iting Chinese Friendship Delegation, “If the American imperialists fail in Vietnam,
then they will collapse in Asia.” He added, “We are supporting Vietnam as if it were
our own war. When Vietnam has a request, we will disrupt our own plans in order
to try to meet their demands.”51 Kim Il Sung also offered to send “volunteer [military]
forces” to assist the Vietnamese Communists but Ho Chi Minh declined this request
for unknown reasons.52
Thus, while there is no smoking gun document that directly links the Pueblo
crisis to solidarity with the Vietnamese Communists, the rhetoric from the leadership
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in Pyongyang indicated that the North Korean government saw the war in Vietnam
as a yardstick to measure one’s revolutionary commitment to  anti- imperialism. Only
a few weeks after capturing the Pueblo, the North Korean government released a
statement that said, “The Korean people are effectively prepared and always ready
to fight alongside the Vietnamese people, whenever the Vietnamese people need
it.”53 Capturing the Pueblo was Kim Il Sung’s attempt to further the global disman-
tlement of U.S. imperialism and assist the Vietnamese Communists on his own
accord. As Bill Streifer highlighted in his 2016 North Korean Review article based on
newly declassified CIA materials, North Korea’s capture of the Pueblo “was probably
aimed at ‘generating diversionary pressures on the U.S. at a time when Communist
forces in South Vietnam are poised to launch a major  country- wide offensive.’”54
The North Koreans also took great interest in the continuation of the Cuban
revolution. In 1968, diplomatic relations between the two countries were so close
that Cuban Deputy Premier Raul Castro said, “If someone is interested in what the
Cubans’ opinion is on certain questions, he should ask the [North] Koreans.” He
continued, “And if someone asks what [North] Korea’s standpoint may be in certain
cases, he can safely ask the Cubans about that. Our views are completely identical
in everything.”55 Meanwhile, in a speech at a 1968 North Korean industrial exhibition
in Havana, Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Trade Marcelo Fernandez “referred to [North]
Korea as the sole country besides Cuba where there was a spirit of real internation-
alism.”56 Pyongyang reciprocated this friendly rhetoric in 1968 by stressing the cor-
rectness of the Cuban government’s revolutionary line and called Fidel Castro “the
great leader of the Cuban revolution and the Cuba people.”57 A Soviet diplomat in
the DPRK said “bringing the armed struggle against American imperialism to the
forefront is typical of the position of the KWP and the Cuban Communist Party.”58
In addition to rhetorical solidarity, North Korea reportedly sent a group of 700 vol-
unteers with weapons and equipment to Cuba.59 To borrow the phrase typically
reserved for Sino–North Korean solidarity, relations between Cuba and the DPRK
were truly “as close as lips to teeth” in the late 1960s. The North Korean leadership
attached a sort of ideological romanticism to Cuba as it was a small island nation
vigorously opposing U.S. imperialism in the Western hemisphere. Within the North
Korean consciousness, the Cubans were brave revolutionaries that also occupied an
imaginary frontline in the global battle against U.S. imperialism.
Beginning in 1955, North Korean leadership proclaimed an attachment to the
Juche philosophy, which translated directly from  Sino- Korean characters means
master of one’s body and is typically rendered in  English- language scholarship as
 self- reliance, subjectivity, or  self- importance. Some scholars have used North Korea’s
nationalistic ideology of Juche as a way to explain DPRK’s  self- imposed reclusiveness
and isolation.60 However, this explanation of North Korea’s Juche ideology neglects
the massive importance that Pyongyang historically tied to international revolu-
tionary movements, especially those in Vietnam and Cuba. As Kim Il Sung told an
East German official in April 1968, “We talk a lot about  self- reliance, and many peo-
ple misunderstand that. We don’t ask, however, for  self- reliance outside the socialist
camp. We ask for  self- reliance in the interest of consolidating the unity of the socialist
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camp.” Kim added, “We ask for  self- reliance in the interest of the education of our
people. Some countries want us to follow them blindly, but we cannot do that.”61
During the late 1960s, the North Korean perception of its  self- interests was
linked to the successes of the Vietnamese and Cuban revolutions. The North Korean
philosophy of “self-reliance” was not a nationalistic policy per se if these two other
respective  anti- imperialist nations are taken into account. North Korean newspapers,
speeches, and financial resources both devoted a significant amount to the Viet-
namese and Cuban struggles for autonomy. This reflects an internationalist  anti-
imperialist attitude, not one of nationalistic  self- interests. Thus, North Korean sub-
jectivity during the late 1960s included Vietnam and Cuba. As Cuban Foreign Min-
ister Raul Roa said at a January 1968 Cuba–DPRK friendship rally, “There existed a
great triangle in world politics, and this was  Cuba- Vietnam-Korea. These three coun-
tries were the sole true manifestations of armed revolution.”62
North Korea’s capture of the Pueblo seems to have been a way to divert Amer-
ican attention from the war in Vietnam, resist U.S. suppression of the Cuban revo-
lution, and perhaps provoke the U.S. military into a  two- front war in Asia. North
Korea’s military expenditure in 1968 certainly signaled that the leadership was
preparing for war. In 1968, the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry scoffed at the massive
allocation of North Korea’s state resources to its national defense. A Soviet report
on the DPRK’s military stated, “According to unofficial data, in 1968 the actual
expenses for military purposes exceeded 40% of the state budget.”63 As discussed in
the previous section on honor, North Korean overconfidence and militant zeal was
a product of Kim Il Sung’s ubiquitous personality cult. The sycophancy and martial
vigor embedded within this cultish leader worship resulted in a massive garrison
state. This garrison state was going to be wielded by Pyongyang for its own  self-
interests and to also assist its revolutionary comrades in Vietnam and Cuba. To the
leadership in Pyongyang, small  anti- imperialist nations were the only true vanguard
of world revolution that backed up its radical rhetoric with militant actions.
VI. Conclusion
The Western media often labels North Korean leaders as “irrational,” “crazy,”
or mad.”64 However, when critical analysis is applied to situations from Pyongyang’s
perspective, seemingly irrational actions such as the 1968 capture of the Pueblo can
be seen as logical and coherent. Thucydides intended his work to be “a possession
for all time” and his insights have informed the likes of Thomas Hobbes, Thomas
Jefferson, John Adams, and contemporary U.S. political and military leaders.65 While
Thucydides most likely would have never predicted a state as draconian as the DPRK
would develop, his theoretical insights into the human condition and national inter-
ests allow the modern scholar to grasp onto the timeless applicability of fear, honor,
and interests. Much like the ancient Athenians and Spartans, the North Koreans are
no different when it comes to its actions and these three modes of analysis can
explain most, if not all, of the regime’s decisions. In addition, as the U.S. and North
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Korean leaderships currently negotiate the terms of Pyongyang’s denuclearization,
the errors of the past and the U.S. government’s inability to understand the DPRK
perspective should be taken into account.
Ultimately,  all- out war did not erupt on the Korean Peninsula during the late
1960s. Thus, Thucydides’  multi- causal framework of fear, honor, and interests falls
a bit short in its application to the Pueblo incident. Pyongyang’s bellicose rhetoric
and militant zeal during this time period may seem like it was mere propaganda.
However, in the context of absolute autocracies such as the DPRK, this mobilization
of emotions could have lead directly to military conflict. Internal observations of
the DPRK after the Pueblo crisis indicate that paranoia and panic permeated
throughout North Korea. As the Romanian embassy explained, “A state of general
tension prevails in Pyongyang; troop movements and neighborhood  anti- air defense
drills continue; night alarm drills using planes and floodlights are intensifying; in
Pyongyang and in the suburbs,  anti- air bunkers from the Korean War have been
restored and new bunkers have been built between apartment buildings and next to
every single household.”66 Without a system of checks and balances, absolute autoc-
racies such as Kim Il Sung’s North Korea can become so entangled in  emotions-
based mobilization campaigns that they extend into  full- on military conflicts. With
power concentrated in the hands of a single strongman, fighting wars over emotions
may seem superficial and irrational but in the context of absolute autocracies, they
can quickly become the main drivers of military conflict. As contemporary negoti-
ations drag on between Washington and Pyongyang regarding North Korea’s nuclear
development, understanding the character of the DPRK’s system is essential for U.S.
foreign policy.
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